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Market versus Political Decision Making 
Implications from Discounted Utility Maximization
By
A l f r e d  M a u s s n e r
This paper studies the relation between institutional change and socio-economic 
circumstances within the choice theoretic framework of a two sector model of 
optimal Capital accumulation. Institutional change is seen as reflected in the im- 
portance o f political decision making. It is shown that the opportunity costs of 
political decision making might decrease if the social rate of time preference does 
increase. Furtherm ore, political decision making is positively (negatively) related to 
the rate o f depreciation of private (public) Capital. These results confirm arguments 
that there might be a positive relation between economic progress and social sta- 
bility on the one hand and political decision making on the other hand.
I. Introduction
It has been argued, namely by Olson (1982), that economic progress eventually 
brings about institutional change creating major obstacles to the efficient working 
of market forces. Thereby, economic progress will slow down and will finally be 
halted. Neumann (1985) shows that this process is not irreversible. In his model, 
institutional change is closely related to the social rate o f time preference, which, in 
tum, depends positively on per capita income. Hence, when economic growth slows 
down time preference will decrease, and market forces will regain social acceptance. 
The related institutional change will trigger a new upswing.
These arguments depend heavily on the proposed relation between institutional 
change and the socio-economic circumstances within which the latter takes place. It 
is the concem o f this paper to highlight this relation within a choice theoretic 
framework.
In order to adopt this perspective it is necessary to make the idea of institutional 
change operational. I shall do so within two different kinds of models. Consider, 
first, a general equilibrium type framework where the government acts as if it max- 
imized the utility of a representative citizen. A simplifying picture depicts Western
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industrialized societies as composed of two sectors: the private sector, where market 
forces determine the supply of private goods, and the public sector, where collective 
or political decisions govern the supply o f public goods. W ithin this context, the 
relative size of the public sector indicates the importance o f political decision mak- 
ing; its variations reflect institutional change. Thus, an appropriate modelling 
strategy for the question at hand is to consider m arket and political allocation as 
production techniques of private and public goods, respectively.
With respect to the private sector, this approach is fairly well known. It is the 
procedure of the neoclassical theory o f optimal growth to depict a market economy 
in a one sector model where capital and labour produce private goods. If the public 
sector is modelled likewise it is essential to give sense to the notions of labour and 
Capital input in public production. O f course, labour and capital input might simply 
refer to the physical quantity of labour and of capital employed by the government. 
Yet, in as much as the supply of public goods is not merely a m atter of physical 
production, but o f collective decisions, too, the concept of public labour necessarily 
extends to the human effort involved in public decision making. By the same token, 
the notion o f public capital must comprise both physical capital and the insti­
tutional prerequisites for public decision making. Since the constitutional and the 
political structure of a nation underwent change, public capital is exposed to depre- 
ciation like private capital is.
Slightly different notions of public labour and capital pertain to the second kind 
of model, and in order to emphasize the differences I shall use the adjective ‘polit- 
ical’ instead o f ‘public’. Think of a representative household whose utility depends 
on private goods as well as on her participation in political decision making. This 
assumption may be justified in either way: there are public goods, where a link 
between their supply and individually taken actions exists, and /o r our agent derives 
satisfaction from the propagation o f her ideological and political beliefs. Insti­
tutional change, then, does result from shifts of emphasis put on political instead of 
market decision making. In this case, political labour refers to her effort spent for 
various kinds of political action, such as, e.g., voting, lobbying, and founding or 
joining interest groups. Political capital consists o f physical capital (think o f an 
interest group’s office) and of the organizational, formal and informal prerequisites 
for effective political influence (the organizational body of a political party or an 
interest group, established relations to legislators, the goodwill created by political 
campaigns, knowledge and information that enable political judgments).
These considerations should suffice to motivate the strategy of the paper. In the 
next section I shall develop a two-sector model where a representative firm produces 
a private good and where the government produces a public good. The instanta- 
neous utility of the representative household is a function of both kinds of goods. 
The govemment’s policy is to maximize the discounted utility of the household. The 
comparative-statics of the stationary allocation with respect to the model’s P a r a ­
meters, namely, the social rate o f time preference and the rates of depreciation of 
private and public capital, provide insights into the relation between the socio- 
economic environment and the related institutional change. In Section III a few,
chiefly formal, modifications transform this model into a partial equilibrium model. 
A representative Citizen allocates labour and Capital between private production 
and political participation. Again, the hypothesis o f intertemporal utility maximi- 
zation underlies the agent’s decision making. The comparative-static properties of 
this model enforce the results obtained from the first model and offer additional 
insights. An Appendix covers mathematical details. Since the two models differ 
mathematically only slightly, I only discuss model two there. The main findings of 
this paper are summarized in the concluding Section IV. They provide support of 
the thesis that there is a positive relation between the rate of economic progress and 
social stability on the one hand and the tendency towards increasing political deci­
sion making on the other hand.
II. Private and Public Production under Optimal Government Policy
This section considers a two-sector economy with three types of agents: a repre­
sentative firm, N  identical households, and the govemment. There are two pro- 
duced goods. The factors o f production are labour (n) and capital (k). The division 
of labour between public and private production may change at each point o f time. 
It is, however, not possible to transfer capital from one sector to the other. The size 
ofnet investment alone alters a sector’s capital equipment. In the following presenta- 
tion o f the formal model, I suppress the time argument of all variables. A dot 
denotes differentiation with respect to time. All variables refer to per capita magni- 
tudes. Variables pertaining to the private (public) sector carry the superscript p(g).
The firm combines labour, nF, and capital, kp, to  produce yp = f  (np, k p) units of 
output. The production fu n c tio n /is  linearly homogenous and twice continuously 
differentiable. The partial derivatives satisfy: f  >  0, f u <  0, and f } >  0, i , j  =  1, 2, 
where the subscript 1 (2) denotes partial differentiation with respect to labour 
(capital). The firm aims at maximizing its discounted cash flow. Let w denote the 
real wage rate, ip gross investment, öp the constant rate of depreciation of capital, 
and q  the discount rate. The firm’s decision is the solution to the following problem:
(II.l) max j  i f ( n p, k p) -  wnp -  F] e~g,dt 
o
s.t. k p = ip - ö k p 
ip, np > 0 
*p(0) =  k p0
In this optimal control problem, the Controls are labour and gross investment. It 
is well known (see, e.g., Arrow and Kurz (1970) or Kamien and Schwartz (1981) 
that any solution to this problem must satisfy
(II.2a) A ( n p, k p) =  w
(II.2b) f 2(np, k p) = q + Sp
(II.2c) k p = ip -  6pk p
The f  are homogenous o f degree zero, and Capital at time t is given. Therefore, 
equations (II.2.a,b) can be solved for nF and w to yield
(II.3.a) np = k p<P(e + öp), <2>' >  0
(II.3.b) w = V ( q + öp), V  < 0
Next, consider a representative household. She supplies one unit of labour and 
spends her net income on consumption. H er (full employment) income consists of 
wages, w, and dividend payments, y p — wnp — ip. Given the tax rate t  her demand 
for private goods is
(II.4) cp =  (1 -  t ) [yp + (1 -  np) w -  zp]
The government hires the unemployed work force,
(II. 5) «» =  1 -  np
and buys P units o f private goods to enlarge the productive capacity of public 
capital. The requirement of a balanced budget confines government expenditures to
(11.6) tv (1 — np) +  ig =  t  [yp +  (1 — n") w -  P]
Equations (II.4) through (II.6) imply the goods market Clearing condition
(11.7) yp = cp + ip + ig
Public capital and labour produce c9 = h(ng, k9) units o f public goods. The func- 
tion h is linear homogenous, twice continuously differentiable with partial deriva­
tives > 0, hu < 0, h,j > 0, i , j  = 1 ,2 .  The stock o f public capital evolves according 
to
k» = p -  Sgk g ,
where ög denotes the rate of depreciation. The government maximizes the discount- 
ed utility of a representative household. Utility at time t is a function u : R+ -> R + of 
private and public consumption. If  the public good is a pure collective good, the N  
households will be able to consume each unit supplied jointly. Hence, u 
= u(cp, Nca). Suppose that u is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, 
and satisfies > 0, uu < 0, >  0, i,j =  1,2. The optimal government policy solves 
the following problem:
au
(II.8) max j  u(cp, Nc9)e~e,dt 
o
s.t. k p = ip ~ ö pk p
fa = p ~  5* k«
cp + F + P = k pf ( $ ( Q  + Sp), 1)
c* =  h( l  - k p$ (g  + öp) ,k 9)
P +  w [1 — k p<P(g +  <5P)]
T “  cp +  P +  w [1 -  k p<P(e + <5P)]
* '(0 )  =  kg 
k?{ 0) =  k l  
cp, cg, ip, i9 > 0
where the Controls are cp, c9, ip, and P. Once the optimal policy has been found, the 
government buys P units of goods, hires n9 =  1 — np units o f labour, and does 
announce the tax rate. Equation (II.4) and the goods market Clearing condition
(II.7), then, determine private consumption and investment.
Consider an interior, stationary solution to Problem (II.8). This solution satisfies 
the following equations:
( I i .9 .a ) / ( * ( e  +  5 0 ,1 )  -  (e +  <5P) =  n U2(? P; NJ \ (\ - k p<P(Q +  öp), k9)
u1 (cp, Nc9)
u2 (cp, Nc9)
(II.9.b) e +  «5® =  N  ’ J h2( 1 -  kp<P(g +  6P), k9)
ul (cp, Nc9)
(II.9.c) c9 =  h( l  — k p$(Q + öp), k9)
(II.9.d) kpf(<P(e +  öp), 1) =  cp +  Spkp +  ö9k9
U pon consideration o f equations (II.2.a, b) the equations above can be substi- 
tuted by a more convenient set o f six equations in the six unknowns cp, c9, np, ng, kp, 
and k9. Observe that multiplying equation (II.9.a) by {kpjnp) =  1 I<P(q + äp) yields 
f x = N(u1/u l ) h l , since k pf  (<P, 1) =  / (np, k p) = f 1np + f 2np and q + Sp = f 2. Add 
equation (II.2.b) and the labour m arket Clearing condition np + n9 = 1 to System 
(II.9) to get
(Il.IO.a) e + bp = M n p, k ”)
u (cp Nc9)
(Il.IO.b) e +  5« =  N - 2) '  h, (n9, k») 
ux (cp, Nc9)
(II.IO.c) f i  (np, kp) = N
(Il.IO.d) 0 =  f ( n p, k ”) - c p -  bpk p -  ögk g
(Il.IO.e) 0 =  h i a ^ k 9) - ^
(Il.IO.f) 1 =  np + ne
Equation (Il.IO.a) is a well known condition on (private) Capital accumulation. It 
states that the marginal product o f the stationary Capital stock must be equal to the 
user costs o f Capital, q  + öp. Equation (Il.IO.b) is the equivalent condition with 
respect to public Capital. The term N (u 2/u1), the sum o f the households’ rates of 
substitution between private and public consumption, defines the price of public 
goods in terms of private goods. Therefore, equation (II.IO.c) states that the m ar­
ginal product o f labour (in units of private goods) is the same in both sectors. The 
remaining three equations are market Clearing conditions on goods and labour.
The stationary allocation determined by System (11.10) depends on the social rate 
of time preference, q , and the rates of depreciation of private and public capital, öp 
and ög, respectively. These variables may be considered as indicators o f the socio- 
economic climate, as I shall explain in a moment. Hence, the comparative-static 
properties of the model allow to draw conclusions as to the relation between socio- 
economic conditions and institutional change. It is convenient to indicate the rela­
tive importance of public production and political issues by N ^ f c ”, i. e., the amount 
of public goods consumed together with each unit o f private goods. This relation is 
independent of income effects if the instantaneous utility function u is homothetic. 
A somewhat weaker assumption, namely, that substitution effects dominate coun- 
teractive income effects, is, however, sufficient to obtain clear cut answers with 
respect to N(fijcp. Besides this relation, capital intensity and average labour pro- 
ductivity of private production, k pfnp and y p/np, respectively, will be used to de- 
scribe a stationary allocation.
It is straightforward but rather cumbersome exercise to discover the 
comparative-static properties o f System (11.10). I do not reproduce the calculations 
here, for this would require too much space. I refer the interested reader to the 
Appendix. Table 1 presents the results.
They depend, o f course, on the assumptions made thus far and on the qualifica- 
tions just mentioned. A simple mechanism is responsible for the model’s outcome: 
changes of exogenous variables entail a reevaluation of resources that alters the 
opportunity costs o f public production. In more detail, there are the following 
causalities. If the social rate of time preference increases savings decline raising the 
relative price of capital. As a consequence, capital intensity and average labour 
productivity of the private sector decline. If  production in the private sector is more 
capital intensive than public production the opportunity costs o f public production 


















kp/np - ' - 0
y p/np - - 0
crease via an increase of the rate of depreciation capital intensity and average 
labour productivity decline. The private sector’s costs o f production rise and the 
related shift in demand shrinks its share in the total production of consumer goods. 
Similarly, the rate o f depreciation of public Capital is inversely related to the size of 
public production. It exerts, however, no effect upon the private sector’s Capital 
intensity and labour productivity.
In what sense do these results contribute answers to the problem addressed in this 
paper? Consider, first, the proposed relation between economic progress, time pref­
erence, and public production. In the model, a positive link between time pref­
erence and public production depends on public production being more labour 
intensive than private production. Since public capital is a broadly defined concept 
it is not seif evident whether this condition is satisfied. Hence, the model does not a 
priori establish a positive link between economic prosperity and public production. 
It hints, however, at another way by which economic progress might increase public 
production. It is reasonable to assume that the rate o f depreciation of private 
capital is positively related to the rate o f technical and economic progress since a 
rapid succession of new products and techniques of production shortens the 
economic life time o f capital. Therefore, by increasing user costs o f private capital 
rapid economic progress might decrease the costs o f public production and shift 
attention from market to public decision making. By analogy, the rate of depreci­
ation of public capital is related to the rate o f institutional and political change. 
Hence, if economic and political development bring about social stability, they will 
favour institutional change towards increasing public decision making.
The focus o f this section is upon a representative Citizen whose utility at time t 
depends on her consumption of private goods, cp, and her level o f political activity, 
c9, according to u = u(cp, c9). Let y p =  / (np, k p) denote the relation between market 
income (yp) and labour (np) and Capital (kp) devoted to  private production. Similar- 
ly, cg = h(ng, k 9) relates the level o f political activity attained (ca) to the am ount of 
labour effort (ng) and capital (k?) spent for political activities. She eam s y p on the 
market, pays xyp taxes, and splits her net income, (1 — r ) yp between consumption 
(cp) and investment in private and political Capital, ip and P, respectively. Thus, her 
budget constraint reads (1 — x)yp > c p + ip + P. Given her decision, the stocks of 
capital change according to k j = f  — öi k i, j  =  p, g. Assume that her total labour 
effort is confined to 1 and that her decision criterion is dicounted utility. Let q > 0 
denote her rate of time preference. Finally, let the functions u,f,  and h have the same 
properties as they have in Section II. The choice problem o f the representative 
citizen is:
k* = P -  S9k a
(1 -  t )y p > cp +  ip +  i9 
c9 < h ( n g, k g)
1 >  =  np + ng
k p( 0) =  kg 
k g( 0) =  k l
0 <  cp, c9, ip, P, np, rP
A  stationary, interior optimal solution to this problem is determined by the 
following set o f equations:
(III.1) max j  u(cp, c?)e e'dt
o
s.t. k p = ip — öpk p
(III.2.a) Q + öp = { \ - x ) f 2{np, k p)
(III.2.b)
(III.2.d) 0 =  (1 -  r ) f ( n p, k p) - c p - ö pk p -  ögk g
(III.2.e) b = h { r p , k * ) - d l
(III.2.f) 1 = np + ns
Equation (III.2.a) and equation (III.2.b) are the conditions on capital accumula- 
tion. They require equality between user costs and marginal productivity of capital. 
Equation (III.2.c) ensures that both kinds o f decision making yield the same (net) 
marginal productivity of labour in terms o f private goods. The remaining three 
equations of System (III.2) exclude any waste o f resources. In particular, net value 
added, (1 —1 ) / ( - ) — öpk p — 89k g, is consumed (Equation (III.2.d)), and the avail- 
able work hours are spent for earning money and exerting political influence 
(equation (III.2.f)).
Table 2 shows the comparative-static properties of System (III.2). Since the 
model is mathematically almost identical with the model of the previous section, it 
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Given the differences between the concept o f public capital and the concept of 
political capital, the assumption of market decision making being more capital 
intensive than political decision making appears to  be more reasonable in the con- 
text o f this model. After all, for most people political participation is related to 
gathering and Processing information, to voting and bargaining, and to volunteer- 
ing in political campaigns.
From  the reasonirvg behind the model it is not surprising to  find the tax rate 
positively associated with political decision making: the tax rate raises the costs of 
market decision making by reducing the net benefits from resources devoted to 
private production. It might be argued, however, that this relation is somewhat 
counterintuitive if political decision making gives raise to expanding public produc­
tion. After all, the tax burdon should induce efforts to shrink not to enlarge the 
public sector. Yet, I should like to argue, it might be perfectly rational to  act as 
predicted by the model: namely, whenever there is reasonable belief that it will be 
the fellow citizens bearing the tax burdon associated with government growth. If 
one accepts that point o f view, the model hints at a seif enforcing mechanism by 
which an expanding public sector might encourage demand for public goods.
The inverse relation between depreciation o f political capital and political deci­
sion making might help explain the seemingly inherent tendency of bureaucratic 
organisations to further expand: within tight and encrusted institutional bodies 
there is only little danger of loosing once established channels of influence, and the 
rules of the bureaucratic game hardly change. Hence, the user costs of political 
capital are comparatively low, and seeking benefits via political decision making is 
(relatively) profitable.
IV. Conclusion
This paper is focused on the relation between institutional change and socio- 
economic circumstances within the choice theoretic framework of discounted Util­
ity maximization. Institutional change is seen as reflected in the size of public pro­
duction as compared to the size of private production. The formal structure of a two 
sector model relates this indicator to the social rate o f time preference and the rates 
of depreciation of private and public capital. These exogenous variables, in tum , 
reflect the socio-economic climate. As in Uzawa (1968) and Neumann (1985), my 
argument is that the social rate of time preference does increase with per capita 
income. Given that private production is more capital intensive than is public pro­
duction, this hypothesis implies a positive relation between per capita income and 
public production. If  economic progress and technical change bring about high 
rates of depreciation of private capital economic progress tends to weaken the 
forces it rests upon by shifting attention from market to  political issues. Finally, in 
as much as the process o f socio-economic development tends to increase insti­
tutional and political stability, and, thus, lowers the user costs of political capital, it 
does encourage political decision making.
I should like to point out that a simple price mechanism is responsible for these 
results: exogenous changes of user costs entail a reevaluation of resources altering 
the opportunity costs of political decision making. Hence, the model does capture 
only one link between institutional change and socio-economic circumstances. Its 
implications should be seen with this qualification.
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The current value Lagrangian o f Problem (III. 1) is
(A .l) L == u{cp, c9) + xpp[ip -  <5PÄ:P] +  -  ö9k 9~\
+  [(1 -  x) f {n p, k") - c p -  ?  -  ? ]  +  A21\h (n\  k?) -  cB]
+  A3[1
tpp and ip9 are costate variables. / 2, and are Lagrange multipliers. Obviously, 
L  is concave in state and costate variables.
Assume that u, / ,  and h are well-behaved. Therefore, any maximum of L  with 
respect to the C o n tr o ls  will be an interior solution, i.e., cp, c9, ip, ig, np, n9 > 0, the 
Lagrange multipliers are strictly positive, and all three constraints on the control 
variables are binding. Consequently, the constraint qualification (see, e. g., Kamien 
and Schwartz (1981), p. 209) is:
Appendix
0 - 1  0 ( l - O A  - 1  -  
1 0 Ai 0 0
0 0 - 1 - 1  0
which is obviously satisfied. The necessary conditions for an interior maximum of 
Problem (III. 1) are:
(A.2.d) ^  =  ^ - ^ = 0
(A.2.e) (1 -  t)A  («p, **) -  ^  =  0
(A.2.f) (« * .* * )-* 3  =  0
(A.2.g) - ( 1  -  t ) / 2(« ', £ p) =  V  ~  Q V
5 j
(A.2.h) -  —  = V 9Ö9 -  A2Ä2(n9, A:9) =  ip9 -  Q\p9
The transversality conditions are (see, e. g., Arrow and Kurz (1970), p. 49, Propo­
sition 8)
(A.3.a) lim e~etxpJ(t) >  0, j  = p , g
t ~ *  oO
(A.3.b) lim e~e,y)J( t)kJ(t) =  0, j  = p , g
t ~ *  00
If  a stationary equilibrium with finite magnitudes of both kp and k 9 is approached 
(A.2.a) through (A.2.d) ensure finite shadow prices xpp and ip9. In this instance, 
q >  0 is necessary and sufficient for (A.3) to be satisfied. This, together with the 
concavity o f L, is sufficient for a maximum o f Problem (III.1) to exist (see, e.g., 
Arrow and Kurz (1970), p. 49, Proposition 8).
From  (A.2) the conditions defining a stationary equilibrium are derived by putt- 
ing ipp =  rp9 =  k p =  k 9, tpp, ip9 >  0. Conditions (A.2), then, reduce to 
(AAa)
(A.4.b) K  {n«, k 9) =  (1 -  x)f,  (np, k p)
U1 vc > ~ )
(A.4.c) (1 -  t ) / 2 (np, k p) = ß + öp
Add the binding constraints to equations (A.4) in order to arrive at System (III.2) 
presented in Section III.
Next, differentiate equations (III.2) considering
(A. 5) ( 1 - t  ) l f 1/ h j  = [u2lu l] and -  e =  6’ -  (1 -  t ) / 2 
from (III.2.c) and (III.2.a), respectively. The result is
<x h 2 - ß h 2 - y < t > h 2 2 0 - y < p h  2 1 0 \ j  d e 9
a  h 1 - ß h , - y < t > h  1 2 7 / 1 2 - y # n y f n  \ /  d e ”
1 0 —  h 2 0 - h i
0
1  d k 9
0 1 ö 9 - e 0 - y f i \  d k p
0 0 0 y f n 0 y f n \  d n 9
0 0 0 0 1 1  / \  d n p
— dg — d ö B 
f yd x  
0
- k pdö — k gd ö 9 —  f d x  
dg +  d d p +  f 2 d z  
0
where: t t - = [ u 1u22 —u2u12] ( u l ) ~2 < 0 ,  ß ■ = [ u 1u21 — u2ui l ^\(u1) ~ 2 >  0, y==(l 
— t)  >  0, and <f> ■■=f l / h l >  0. All derivatives are evaluated at the stationary equilib- 
rium. This system of linear equations allows to calculate the partial derivatives 
dz/dx,  z  e  {cp, c9, np}, x  e {q, Sp, ög, t}. The results can be simplified by recognizing 
/ 11/22  — ( / 12)2 =  0, h11h22 — ( h u ) 2 =  0 (due to the linear homogeneity of/ and h) 
and by considering (A.5) as well as (III.2.b). Insert the results into
=  l l l z 2] 2{z2(dzl l d x ) - z 1(dz2/dx)}
z 1 e {c°, k p}, z 2 e {cp, np} to get the expressions looked for.
Applying this procedure yields with respect to the relation between c^/c” and the 
rate of time preference:
(A.6)  ^ ~2 (cp) ~ 2 { g y n 1(ßcp +  ac9) —  y2 4>n2}
A --=y2 -  h2h12) [ f i 2{ßyf i  - x h J - e f i J  +  
+f 2 2 ( h 1h2 l - h 2hli)  (cch2 — ß ö 9)} > 0
Jtx ==^>[Äi(*1^2 2 - / 12^ 21) + ä 2(A2Äh - h l h12) ' ] + h2{h2f ^ - h j 21) +
+  M / 1J 22 -  *2/ 12) <  0  
n2 --= (h2cp +  ögcg) ( f 12h21 — / i u / 22) +
+  (h1cp +  y f t c9) ( f 22h12 — f i 2h22) — ß i f n ^ n  ~  f n  h22)c9
The first term in the square brackets o f (A.6) is an income effect. The second term
is a substitution effect. The income effect does not alter the ratio c9jcp if the instanta- 
neous utility function u is homothetic. To prove this assertion calculate the partial 
derivatives «j, uip i , j  = 1, 2, from u ■■= G [c9g(ep/c8)], G' > 0, G" < 0,gf > 0,g" < 0, 
and insert the results into
ß c P +  0CC»:= [(«! u21 -  « 2« ! ! ) ^  +  ( ^  U 22 -  « 2 W 12)c9] ( u j * 2
to observe that [ ■ ] = 0 .
The substitution effect is positive if the capital intensity o f/  exceeds the capital 
intensity of h. Due to the linear homogeneity of /  and h,
/ n  =  — /21  (kp/np) > f 22 — ~ f i 2 (np/ k p)
and
*11  =  — h21(kg/ng) , h12 = - h i2(n«lkg) .
Therefore, n2 can be rewritten as
te2 .= (h2 cp + ögd>)fl2h2l [1 -  (kg/ng) (npl k p)]
-  (*1 +  7fi  c9) h i2f 12[(np/ k p) -  (n9/k 9)]
-  e/21  A12 [1 -  (* '/« ')  («9/ ^ ) ]  i  5  Kny tv
which proves the assertion.
The analytical expressions for the remaining partial derivatives of c9/cp are:
— = A 2(cp) 2y2<t>{— ( / 2 / 1 2  — / 1/ 22) [(*i A22 — h2h2]) c p 
+ (y /ih22 -  d9h2l)cg] +  e C A /n  - f J 2 i )h22 <?} > 0  
d^ r L = A - 2{cpy 2{ - y 2<t>U,2(h1h22- h 2h21)cp
+  <£*22/11 +  <57i2*2i -  7/ 1/ 1 2*22) ^ ]}  > 0 
= A ~ 2 (cp) ~2 { -  y2 cf> U 22 (h2*11  -  *1  * 12) cp 
+  (0/ 2 1 * 1 2  +  <5722*h -  7/ 1/ 2 2* 12)^ ]}  < 0
where all income effects have been eliminated.
The partial derivatives o f k p/np are
fl (hP/np)
— ^ —  =  A - 2(np)~ 2y( j ) { -a l h , , (h ih 22 -  h2h21) +  *2(*2* n  -
+  0 (* i* 22 -  *2 * 12) (7/1 «P +  Qkp) +  ^ ^ ( * 2 * 1 1  -  * 1*21)} < 0
8(kp/np)
8x = A 2(np) 2y<t>{ocf2[h2(k2h12- h 1h22) + h2(/i1h21 ~ / t 2h n )]n
+  ß f z ( h 2h l 2 - h 1 h22)  ( -  e k p -  r / i  « p )  +
+ ö9ß f 2(h2h tl  -  h l h l l )np} < 0
8 ( k pjnp 1  d ( k p/np) ^
Söp ~ J 2 Sr < 0
Finally, note that
(ypjnp) = / [ l ,  {kp/np) j
and therefore
d(x>ln?) _  aC/cP/nQ 
dx 2 dx
which allows to directly calculate the partial derivatives of (yp/np) from those of 
(kp/np).
